Internet censorship in Iran in 2026: what is blocked and how people get around it

This page shows what OONI measurements say is blocked in Iran in September 2026, what the rules say about VPNs there, and how people keep using blocked websites and apps. Volunteers run OONI Probe from their own networks. We sort every country and website pair into confirmed blocking, signs of possible blocking, no sign of blocking, or not measured, as on the internet censorship index. In this edition 21 of 24 websites are at national scale.

What is blocked in Iran, according to OONI data

In this edition, Iran has 21 websites at national scale (21 widespread, 0 partial), including Netflix, Facebook and Instagram.

3 websites show no sign of blocking in this edition, and a block on a network OONI did not test would not show.

The panel covers social platforms, messaging services, news and video, reference and search, the Tor Project and VPN provider websites. OONI counts VPNs, proxies and Tor among the common circumvention tools, so their websites show how easy it is to reach the usual ways around other blocks.

The table gives each website's status, its confirmed rate with the tests behind it, its anomaly rate, and how many networks with enough data block it on their own. Read a rate together with its test count. For someone living in or visiting Iran, a website confirmed blocked at national scale fails often without a workaround.

Three terms describe how widely a website is blocked:

• National scale means confirmed blocked on at least 2% of its tests, from at least 30 tests, and still at 2% or more when the single biggest network is left out.
• Widespread means at least 20% of tests, and still 20% or more without the biggest network.
• Partial means 2% or more but under 20% once the biggest network is left out.

How OONI confirms blocking in Iran

OONI lists Iran among the countries where ISPs show users a notice page saying a website is blocked. A block page is one of the two things that let OONI confirm blocking automatically, and the other is a DNS answer pointing to an address OONI links to censorship.

To reach that verdict, OONI's Web Connectivity test runs three steps from the volunteer's network and from a control server, then compares the two:

1. a DNS lookup;
2. a TCP connection;
3. an HTTP request.

A match means no clear sign of interference, and a difference is flagged.

Blocking that produces neither a block page nor a known censorship address shows up only as anomalies, which OONI warns may be false positives. So the confirmed counts are a lower bound, not a full picture. Our single-network check left 21 of Iran's 21 candidate websites at national scale.

How much rests on one network?

OONI records the network of every test by its ASN, the number that identifies a network, and censorship can differ from one network to the next. The cards below show the websites where one network still holds half or more of the confirmed blocks, and the rate without it.

Shutdowns and tiered access sit outside these numbers

Three reports show what the index cannot see:

• Freedom House reported that the regime began blocking proxy servers and VPNs amid the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. It said Nord VPN, Proton VPN and TunnelBear were inaccessible in its 2023 to 2024 coverage period.
• In April 2026 Al Jazeera described Internet Pro, a limited, metered service sold to people the state selects. On it, thousands of sites and most global messaging services stay blocked.
• AFP reported in late May 2026 that NetBlocks saw a partial restoration of connectivity after a shutdown that began when war broke out in late February. Witnesses said mobile internet remained cut and VPNs were still needed for some social media.

Our sources stop at late May 2026, so we cannot say whether connectivity was cut during the September 2026 tests. This index counts blocked websites, not shutdowns.

Which apps and services does blocking in Iran affect?

OONI's panel tests websites, not apps. These are the results for services people ask about most, and the table above lists the rest.

• OONI confirmed blocking of Instagram in Iran on 76.2% of 5,023 tests in September 2026.
• OONI confirmed blocking of Facebook in Iran on 77.3% of 5,725 tests in September 2026.
• OONI confirmed blocking of X (x.com) in Iran on 65.5% of 2,815 tests in September 2026.
• OONI confirmed blocking of Telegram in Iran on 56.0% of 2,696 tests in September 2026.
• OONI confirmed blocking of YouTube in Iran on 72.0% of 4,561 tests in September 2026.
• OONI confirmed blocking of Netflix in Iran on 95.0% of 161 tests in September 2026, and one network, AS42337 (Respina Networks & Beyond PJSC), holds 67.3% of the confirmed blocks.
• OONI confirmed blocking of Tor Project in Iran on 94.4% of 179 tests in September 2026, and one network, AS42337 (Respina Networks & Beyond PJSC), holds 62.1% of the confirmed blocks.

The panel lists Twitter and X as two domains of one service. The panel has no WhatsApp website, so this page cannot say whether it is blocked. A site that loads in a browser does not prove its app connects, and the reverse is also true. A confirmed block shows only on networks where volunteers ran the test.

Iran has prohibited unlicensed VPN use since February 2024

Two reports from 2024 describe the ban.

• Freedom House's 2024 edition reports that the Supreme Council of Cyberspace prohibited unlicensed VPNs in February 2024. Selling and distributing VPNs had been criminalized earlier, in 2023. Some analysts said the council overstepped its authority by prohibiting use as well as sale.
• RFE/RL reported in February 2024 that the directive was endorsed by the Supreme Leader and bans VPN tools unless authorities explicitly authorize them. The decree did not criminalize use, and an expert said it fails to clarify the consequences for those who defy it.

Neither report says anything about enforcement today. This is a summary of reports, not legal advice.

Changes since the previous edition

Compared with August 2026, here is what moved in Iran. Only websites measured in both months can move. A website that gained or lost enough tests to be classified is a change in measurement volume, not in blocking.

How do people get around the blocks?

People route their traffic through a VPN server in another country, so a blocked website loads from there. OONI counts VPNs and proxies among the common circumvention tools. A VPN cannot help when the connection itself is cut.

VPN provider websites are the first obstacle, and the table shows each one OONI measured.

Scroll sideways to see every column

Country	ExpressVPN	NordVPN	Surfshark	Proton VPN	PureVPN	CyberGhost	Private Internet Access	IPVanish	TotalVPN
IranIR	94.0%188 of 200Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	93.0%198 of 213Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	90.5%191 of 211Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	90.3%195 of 216Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	92.3%169 of 183Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	95.3%201 of 211Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	95.6%173 of 181Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	96.9%186 of 192Widespread †3 or fewer networks with enough tests	Not measured

• Widespread confirmed on at least 20% of tests, and still at 20% or more without the biggest network
• Partial confirmed on 2% or more of tests, but under 20% once the biggest network is left out
• One network only not counted
• Anomalies possible blocking, not confirmed
• No sign no sign of blocking in the tests we have, or a few isolated confirmed tests
• Not measured fewer than 30 measurements

† 3 or fewer networks with enough tests

• Iran: 8 of 8 VPN sites measured are blocked at national scale, at confirmed rates of 90.3% to 96.9%. Per site, blocking shows on 2 of the 2 networks with enough data. On 8 of them one network, AS42337 (Respina Networks & Beyond PJSC), holds 52.2% to 61% of the confirmed blocks; on all other networks the rate is 80.9% to 93.1%.

Source: OONI web_connectivity measurements for September 2026, aggregated and classified by WhatWorks.tech. Provider names link to our profiles where we have one.

Our sources do not say whether Google Play or the Apple App Store load in Iran. Proton VPN says its apps are also on app stores such as the Apple App Store and Google Play when its website cannot be reached. Surfshark advises setting up the app before you board the plane.

Our pick for Iran

The three VPNs below have the highest Iran scores in our research, each from at least three recent published reviews, and only VPNs with that many sources are ranked. Providers describe anti-blocking features: Proton VPN's Stealth protocol, NordVPN's obfuscated servers and Surfshark's NoBorders.

Iran has prohibited unlicensed VPN use since February 2024, and providers' terms on sanctioned countries differ; the FAQ below lists what each says.

Ranked first of the 4 VPNs with enough research data for using a VPN in Iran

1Proton VPNScoreIran score9.3/10

Iran in our research

100%

Obfuscation

Yes, Stealth protocol; Linux app only with Proton Protocols (beta)

Devices at once

10

Money-back

30 days

Read our Proton VPN reviewGet Deal

2NordVPNScoreIran score8.5/10

Iran in our research

83%

Obfuscation

Yes, Obfuscated servers on its main apps; on Linux OpenVPN only

Devices at once

10

Money-back

30 days

Read our NordVPN reviewGet Deal

3SurfsharkScoreIran score8.1/10

Iran in our research

67%

Obfuscation

Yes, NoBorders on Android, iOS, macOS, Windows

Devices at once

Unlimited

Money-back

30 days

Read our Surfshark reviewGet Deal

Ranked by our Iran score out of 10: how well each VPN works for using it in Iran in our research, its obfuscation, apps, devices at once and price. Our scores and the providers' own pages, 19 October 2026. How we rank.

• Check a connection with our VPN check, which shows the country websites see.
• Read the profiles of Proton VPN, NordVPN and Surfshark.
• See every VPN in the provider index.

Read the data as a lower bound, not a full picture

• A signs-only website is a reason to look, not a block, and the two are never added together.
• OONI sees a block only on networks where volunteers ran the test. A website with no sign of blocking may be blocked elsewhere.
• The index tests websites, not apps, and the panel is a fixed sample of sites, so it leaves out many services people use.
• Where a result rests on three or fewer networks with enough tests, the tables mark it, because a block seen on few networks is weaker evidence of a national filter.
• Volunteers choose where and when to run tests, so coverage is uneven from month to month. To inspect individual measurements for Iran, use OONI Explorer.
• The thresholds are our choices. The index shows the method, the map and every country. For a country where blocking varies by network, read the Russia page. The methodology explains how we rank VPNs.

Get the data on request